“This article examines the protracted crisis surrounding the supply of vehicle number plates in Sri Lanka, which is currently characterized by a massive backlog of unissued plates. The core of the issue lies in the long-standing, de facto monopoly held by Access International (Pvt) Ltd and a bitter payment dispute with the Department of Motor Traffic (DMT). While Access claims the DMT owes it over Rs. 650 million and failed to act on new tenders, officials and critics argue that the controversy is rooted in systemic flaws in the country’s procurement governance, administrative inertia, and the inherent risks of supplier dependency that have persisted for over two decades”.
Sri Lanka’s Vehicle Plate Controversy:
Decades of Monopoly, Delays, and Disputed Arrears
The long-standing monopoly in Sri Lanka’s vehicle number plate supply has once again sparked public debate this time over unpaid dues, procurement delays, and a massive backlog of unissued plates. While Access International (Pvt) Ltd, the country’s exclusive number-plate manufacturer for over two decades, claims that the Department of Motor Traffic (DMT) owes it more than Rs. 650 million, officials and industry observers point to deeper structural flaws in procurement design and administrative governance.
Access’s Position: A Case of Non-Payment, Not Non-Performance
In response to reports highlighting supply breakdowns and a 165,000-vehicle backlog, Access International insists that the crisis was caused solely by DMT’s failure to settle dues and complete tender procedures, not by any production lapse on its part.
According to a company statement, Access continued to supply plates “for over twelve months without payment,” following written DMT instructions to ensure continuity until the new tender was finalized. The firm claims that by April 2025, outstanding invoices worth Rs. 655 million remained unpaid, forcing it to suspend production after a year of absorbing the cost.
Access further asserts that it retains ready stock and full capacity to resume manufacturing immediately once payments are settled, arguing that the current shortage and the resultant law-enforcement risks of vehicles without legal plates is “a direct outcome of administrative inaction, not supplier failure.”
The company also notes that since 1999, all number-plate procurements have followed International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and a transparent two-envelope process under the oversight of Technical Evaluation and Cabinet-Appointed Committees. It emphasizes that the 2000 contract was first awarded to Erich UTSCH AG of Germany (represented then by Asia Capital), and that Access International formally entered as UTSCH’s joint-venture partner in 2009, introducing modern security standards to Sri Lanka’s plate system.
Historical Context: Two Decades of Exclusive Supply
Public records, however, show that Access’s control of the supply chain has effectively continued unbroken for roughly 25 years, either directly or through renewals approved at Cabinet level.
The Court of Appeal judgment CA/WRT/0114/2025 explicitly identifies Access International as the outsourced manufacturer authorised by DMT to print number plates for all registered vehicles. Earlier judicial references (CA/WRT/0067/2020) also cite instances where Access was instructed to produce plate’s years after initial vehicle registration, revealing administrative lags between registration and manufacturing orders.
This continuity has made Access a de facto monopoly supplier in a strategically sensitive product line, with limited entry for new competitors. Procurement experts argue that such dominance creates risk of dependency and weakens price competition issues periodically highlighted in Auditor-General management letters and parliamentary oversight committees.
Tender Controversies and Technical Disputes
The 2024–25 tender round, intended to open the field to new suppliers, became mired in technical disputes and legal challenges.
According to tender documents and court filings, the lowest bidders (including Access) were disqualified on material-testing grounds specifically, laboratory results for “elongation at break” of aluminium samples. The Procurement Appeal Board (PAB) and the Court of Appeal were subsequently petitioned to review the decision, with reports estimating that accepting the higher bid could cost the Treasury an additional Rs. 500 million.
Access maintains that it met all required technical specifications and that its samples were rejected under questionable test conditions. Procurement sources, meanwhile, argue that the DMT’s adherence to security-material standards justifies strict evaluation underscoring a grey zone between legitimate quality control and possible bid manipulation.
Governance and Audit Findings
While the National Audit Office (NAO) reports for the Department of Motor Traffic (Head 307) do not name Access directly, they highlight repeated weaknesses in procurement controls, liability management, and contract follow-up. The 2023 audit noted unpaid commitments exceeding Rs. 221 million and irregular registration practices, indicating systemic inefficiency in financial and operational oversight the very environment that allows disputes like the current one to fester.
A Pattern of Administrative Inertia
The Access–DMT standoff has exposed the fragility of Sri Lanka’s public procurement in critical infrastructure.
When a single supplier controls both production know-how and inventory, any payment delay or procedural lapse instantly paralyses an entire system. The result is what motorists now face thousands of newly registered vehicles without official plates and growing frustration among the public.
Industry insiders argue that this crisis could have been avoided through multi-supplier frameworks, staggered contracts, and contingency stock policies, which are standard in many countries to prevent monopolistic lock-ins.
Balancing Access’s Record and Public Accountability
It is undisputed that Access, working with UTSCH AG, introduced modern high-security plates that met global standards and significantly reduced counterfeiting risks. The company’s technical reliability over two decades is well-acknowledged.
However, questions persist over why successive governments renewed the same contract structure for 25 years, and whether the procurement guidelines allowed fair competition for new entrants. The fact that disputes over testing methods, Cabinet approvals, and appeal board interventions have recurred repeatedly suggests an entrenched procurement culture resistant to reform.
Access, for operating within a system that effectively eliminated competition and for not proactively pushing for independent oversight of its long-running engagement.
As the Court of Appeal continues to hear related petitions and the Treasury reviews arrears claims, the larger question remains: Should a single private company, however competent, control a state-critical security function for a quarter century without structural competition?
Until procurement governance and payment discipline improve, Sri Lanka’s number-plate saga will remain a cautionary example of how administrative inertia and supplier dependence can paralyse essential public services.